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The Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking has popularized the construct of making people, 
i.e., inventing types of people who haven’t before existed (1).  No, there’s no Dr. 
Frankenstein-like laboratory or Chinese human genome editing or somehow assuming 
the role of a life-giving God.  Instead, human characteristics—never-before perceived or 
perceived with different degrees of salience and quality—are pooled into an overarching 
category—a type.  And people perceived as manifesting the characteristics—as a figure 
to the ground of whatever else they may manifest—have now been made as an 
example or exemplar of the type.  Thus, these people—this type of person—have never 
previously existed in this way.  These people and their type accrue currency via social 
usage much as through a Wittgensteinian language game (2).  These people and their 
type become characters in our fantasies about people, in our daily interpersonal lives, of 
yet other peoples and types who populate our life world.  People labelled as a type uses 
it as a guide for their own psychology—external behavior, moral and ethical calculus, 
self-identity.  As if once being made, these people foster a thick description (3) within 
the type, incarnate and metaphysically.  But then there’s a psychological drift.  People of 
a type fall into and wittingly develop characteristics not conceived or perceived as part 
of the original type.  As it were, the type mutates.  Experts and professional 
organizations that have sprung forth to explain and pontificate on the type now change 
their expectations—their descriptions and inferences—about the type.  In turn, people 
labelled with the type change their expectations in an iterative, reciprocal interaction that 
spirals forth ad infinitum or eventually into a death spiral.  At this latter event, that type 
of person is unmade, a victim of psychological historicism (4).  
How might self-appointed and socially sanctioned experts on people—mental health 
professionals, poets, psychologists, clairvoyants, other delvers into the soul—manage 
Hacking’s challenge of knowing made people, especially as all people are made?  
Three constructs come immediately to mind, two from literary criticism, one from 
scientific psychology. 
The first literary construct is British poet John Keats’s negative capability also 
exemplified by the couplet of the chamber of maiden thought and the burden of mystery 
“…capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason…[towards] a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the 
Penetralium of mystery…the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or 
rather obliterates all consideration…” (5).  Negative capability also was employed by the 
British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion connoting an attitude of openness of mind “… the 
ability to tolerate the pain and confusion of not knowing, rather than imposing ready-
made or omnipotent certainties upon an ambiguous situation or emotional challenge...” 
(6).   
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The second literary construct is American poet T.S. Eliot’s objective correlative 
connoting “…expressing emotion by finding …a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external 
facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked…” (7).  Although Eliot was focused on invoking emotion in an 
audience, the objective correlative can apply to knowing the made person by that 
person and others. 
The scientific psychological term is empathy—it’s two main definitions knowing what 
someone is feeling and feeling what that someone is feeling.  Unfortunately, these 
definitions and associated psychological research do not definitively bear on knowing 
how to know.  This seems to be the case even as there are efforts to develop and 
assess explicit metacognitive interventions during virtual human experiences to teach 
and develop empathetic communication skills in medias res  (8).  
Enmeshed in making made people, the experts must be at best agnostic as to whether 
they can know anything at all.  How different is this than Wittgenstein’s "…whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (9) ?  
 
References:  (1) Hacking, I. (August 17, 2006).  Making up people.  London Review of 
Books, 28(16), https://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n16/ian-hacking/making-up-people.  (2)  
Wittgenstein, L.  (1973/1953).  (Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe).  Philosophical Investigations.  
Pearson.  (3)  Geertz, Clifford.  (1973).  Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory 
of culture. In (C. Geertz). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Basic Books, 
(pp. 3-30).  (4)  Hoagwood, K.  (1993).  Poststructuralist historicism and the 
psychological construction of anxiety disorders.  Journal of Psychology, 127(1),105-122.  
(5)  Li, O.  (2009). Keats and Negative Capability. Continuum International Publishing 
Group. (p. ix).  Keats, J.  (2008/1899).  The Complete Poetical Works and Letters of 
John Keats.  (Cambridge Edition). Read Country Book.  (p. 277).  (6)  Meg Harris 
Williams, M. H.  (2018/2010). The Aesthetic Development.  Routledge.  (pp. 25-52).  
Bion, W. R. (1970). Attention and interpretation. Tavistock Publications.  (7)  Eliot, T. S.  
(1921).  Hamlet and his problems.  https://www.bartleby.com/200/sw9.html.  (8)  
Formosa, N. J.; Morrison, B. W.; Hill, G. ; & Stone, D.  (March 2018).  Testing the 
efficacy of a virtual reality‐based simulation in enhancing users’ knowledge, attitudes, 
and empathy relating to psychosis.  Australian Journal of Psychology, 70(1), 57-65.  (9)  
Wittgenstein, L.  (2010/1922).  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  (Trans. C. K. Ogden).  
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf.  
 
Keywords:  Assessment.  Empathy.  Epistemology.  Hermeneutics.  Negative 
Capability.  Objective Correlative.  Political.  Profiling.  Psychological.    
 
2
International Bulletin of Political Psychology, Vol. 18, Iss. 7 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol18/iss7/1
Abstract/Description:  This article describes foundational problems in even experts’ 
knowing people from formal psychological assessment to musings on human nature. 
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